Deregulation, Competition, and Consolidation: The Case of the German Interurban Bus Industry

31 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2015

See all articles by Niklas Dürr

Niklas Dürr

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Competition and Regulation Research Group

Kai Hüschelrath

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Sven Heim

MINES ParisTech

Date Written: August 2015

Abstract

We provide an empirical assessment of the German interurban bus industry two years after its deregulation in January 2013. In addition to a general description of key developments of the industry, we use a unique route-level price data set to study both competitive interaction in general and the potential price effects of a recently announced merger of the two largest players in the market in particular. We find that route-level average prices, inter alia, do not only depend on the number of competitors but especially on the composition of firms operating on a particular route. Although our empirical results suggest short-term price increases on certain route types post-merger, it remains an open question whether the merger should be classified as anticompetitive.

Keywords: Deregulation, competition, merger, in terurban bus services, Germany

JEL Classification: L11, L41, L92, K21, K23

Suggested Citation

Dürr, Niklas and Hüschelrath, Kai and Heim, Sven, Deregulation, Competition, and Consolidation: The Case of the German Interurban Bus Industry (August 2015). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 15-061, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661532 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2661532

Niklas Dürr (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Competition and Regulation Research Group ( email )

L7,1
Mannheim, 68161
Germany

Kai Hüschelrath

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Sven Heim

MINES ParisTech ( email )

60 boulevard Saint Michel
Paris, 75006
France

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