The Brazilian Clean Company Act: Using Institutional Multiplicity for Effective Punishment

57 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2015 Last revised: 7 Jan 2016

See all articles by Mariana Mota Prado

Mariana Mota Prado

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law

Lindsey D. Carson

Arnold & Porter, LLP; Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)

Izabela Correa

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: October 13, 2015

Abstract

In Brazil’s battle against corruption over the past two decades, there has been significant progress related to systems of oversight and investigation, but very little progress in holding corrupt actors legally accountable for their transgressions. We suggest that until very recently this could be partially explained by the fact that there was institutional multiplicity (i.e. duplication of functions) in oversight and investigative institutions, while at the punishment stage, a single and underperforming institution — the judiciary — exercised monopolistic authority. To circumvent the limits associated with Brazilian courts, the government is increasingly relying on administrative sanctions for corruption. It is in this context that Brazil has enacted legislation to punish legal persons for both foreign and domestic corruption: the Clean Company Act (Lei Anti-Corrupção), enacted in August 2013, has used institutional multiplicity in an attempt to circumvent the well-known problems that plague the Brazilian anti-corruption system. We suggest that this looks promising, as it follows the same structure of recent reforms that have been successful in Brazil.

Keywords: Brazilian law, corruption law, anti-corruption, public law, institutional multiplicity

JEL Classification: K00, K10, K29, K42

Suggested Citation

Prado, Mariana Mota and Carson, Lindsey D. and Correa, Izabela, The Brazilian Clean Company Act: Using Institutional Multiplicity for Effective Punishment (October 13, 2015). Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 48/2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2673799 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2673799

Mariana Mota Prado (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law ( email )

78 and 84 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty/prado

Lindsey D. Carson

Arnold & Porter, LLP ( email )

555 12th Street, NW
STE 900
Washington, DC 20004
United States

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) ( email )

1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-1984
United States

Izabela Correa

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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