Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition

28 Pages Posted: 21 May 2001

See all articles by Ramon Fauli-Oller

Ramon Fauli-Oller

Universidad de Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Efe A. Ok

Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

Ignacio Ortuño Ortín

University of Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis

Date Written: May 2001

Abstract

We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates are feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.

Keywords: Polarization, political competition

JEL Classification: D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Fauli-Oller, Ramon and Ok, Efe A. and Ortuño Ortín, Ignacio, Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition (May 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=270312

Ramon Fauli-Oller (Contact Author)

Universidad de Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis ( email )

E-03080 Alicante
Spain
+34 96 590 3400 (Phone)
+34 96 590 3614 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Efe A. Ok

Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-998-8920 (Phone)
212-995-4186 (Fax)

Ignacio Ortuño Ortín

University of Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis ( email )

03080 Alicante
Spain
+34 96 590 3400 (Phone)
+34 96 590 3898 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
16
Abstract Views
966
PlumX Metrics