Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory

41 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2016

See all articles by Laurent Bouton

Laurent Bouton

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Queen Mary University of London

Frederic Malherbe

University College London - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2016

Abstract

We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis.

Keywords: constructive abstention, framing, information aggregation, laboratory experiments, unanimity rule, veto power

JEL Classification: C92, D70

Suggested Citation

Bouton, Laurent and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol and Malherbe, Frederic, Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory (January 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11087, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2726567

Laurent Bouton (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Lincoln's Inn Fields
Mile End Rd.
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/aniollls/

Frederic Malherbe

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Drayton House, 30 Gordon Street
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

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