Conflicts of Interest in Finance and Auditing: Can They Be Successfully Regulated, and Does Disclosure Minimize Them?

15 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2016

Date Written: July 13, 2016

Abstract

Relying on research from social psychology and business ethics, this article argues that the current massive regulatory regime surrounding the attempts to curb what is perceived to be damaging conflicts of interests in the financial industry is based on misguided assumptions, and that the trend of increasing detailed rule-making, supervision and sanctioning in this area might be counter-effective.

Keywords: Conflicts of interest, law, finance, regulation, moral reasoning, psychology

Suggested Citation

Kinander, Morten, Conflicts of Interest in Finance and Auditing: Can They Be Successfully Regulated, and Does Disclosure Minimize Them? (July 13, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2809181 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2809181

Morten Kinander (Contact Author)

BI Norwegian Business School ( email )

Nydalsveien 37
Oslo, 0442
Norway

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