Trade, Social Preferences, and Regulatory Cooperation: The New WTO-Think

37 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2016

See all articles by Thomas J. Bollyky

Thomas J. Bollyky

Council on Foreign Relations

Petros C. Mavroidis

Columbia University - Law School; European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW); European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

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Date Written: September 9, 2016

Abstract

This paper advocates changes in the corporate governance of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to reflect the decline in tariffs and other border restraints to commerce and the emerging challenges of advancing freer trade and better regulation in a world economy dominated by global value chains. Together, these changes form an integration strategy that we refer to as the new WTO Think. This strategy remains rooted in the original rationale of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) of reducing the negative externalities of unilateral action and solving important international coordination challenges, but is more inclusive of regulators and non-state actors and more flexible and positive in its means. In particular, we advocate that the WTO should embrace the confluence of shared social preferences and trade, where it exists, as a motivation for advancing international regulatory cooperation. The WTO should also multilateralize the important regulatory cooperation occurring in smaller clubs of like-minded countries and better facilitate the use of plurilateral agreements where consensus across all WTO members is not yet possible.

Keywords: WTO; Reciprocity; MFN; Regulatory Cooperation; Trade; TPP; TTIP

JEL Classification: K40, L5, F1, F13, F42, 024, P33, P45, I18, N4

Suggested Citation

Bollyky, Thomas J. and Mavroidis, Petros C., Trade, Social Preferences, and Regulatory Cooperation: The New WTO-Think (September 9, 2016). EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 47, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 546, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2836937 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2836937

Thomas J. Bollyky (Contact Author)

Council on Foreign Relations ( email )

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Petros C. Mavroidis

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

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European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

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European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

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Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

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