On the (Non) Paradox of (Not) Voting

39 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2002

See all articles by Micael Castanheira

Micael Castanheira

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: January 2002

Abstract

Why do people vote? This question received a lot of attention for more than thirty years, and yet remains unanswered. In this Paper, we take stock of existing empirical regularities and argue that we can use them to improve the model of instrumental voting. Once this is done, we show that purely rational/instrumental factors actually explain a large fraction of turnout variations. To perform our analysis, we use Myerson's (1997, 2000) advances on Poisson Games and generalize the Riker and Ordeshook (1968) seminal model of instrumental voting. Applying our results to US data, we show how our model can explain several stylized facts, like the secular fall in turnout rates in the US.

Keywords: Paradox of voting, rational voter hypothesis, Poisson Games

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D81

Suggested Citation

Castanheira, Micael, On the (Non) Paradox of (Not) Voting (January 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=298222

Micael Castanheira (Contact Author)

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
+32 2 650 4467 (Phone)
+32 2 650 3369 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Do you want regular updates from SSRN on Twitter?

Paper statistics

Downloads
27
Abstract Views
1,111
PlumX Metrics