The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives
Journal of Accounting Research, forthcoming
51 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2017 Last revised: 4 Oct 2021
Date Written: September 16, 2021
This paper studies the long-term consequences of actions induced by vesting equity, a measure of short-term concerns. Vesting equity is positively associated with the probability of a firm repurchasing shares, the amount of shares repurchased, and the probability of the firm announcing a merger or acquisition (M&A). However, it is also associated with more negative long-term returns over the 2-3 years following repurchases and 4 years following M&A. A potential driver of the negative M&A returns is subsequent goodwill impairment. These results are inconsistent with CEOs buying underpriced stock or companies to maximize long-run shareholder value, but consistent with these actions being used to boost the short-term stock price and thus equity sale proceeds. CEOs sell their own stock shortly after using company money to buy the firm’s stock, also inconsistent with repurchases being motivated by undervaluation.
Keywords: Repurchases, M&A, Short-Termism, CEO Incentives, Managerial Myopia
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G32, G34, G35, M12, M52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation