Sanctions for Repeat Offenders: A Question of Wealth?

16 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2017

See all articles by Wolfgang Eggert

Wolfgang Eggert

University of Freiburg - Institute of Public Finance; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Steffen Minter

University of Paderborn - Department of Economics

Maximilian Stephan

University of Freiburg

Handirk von Ungern‐Sternberg

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: November 2017

Abstract

In a two‐period standard law‐enforcement model, individuals observe or break the law. In addition, individuals may offend accidentally. When sanctions are limited by individual wealth constraints, the government chooses appropriate sanctions for first and repeat offenders and the level of monitoring. We assume a welfare‐oriented government and derive subgame‐perfect equilibria for constant, increasing and decreasing sanctions depending on the individual wealth level.

Suggested Citation

Eggert, Wolfgang and Minter, Steffen and Stephan, Maximilian and von Ungern‐Sternberg, Handirk, Sanctions for Repeat Offenders: A Question of Wealth? (November 2017). Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 64, Issue 5, pp. 467-482, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3051439 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12126

Wolfgang Eggert (Contact Author)

University of Freiburg - Institute of Public Finance ( email )

D-79098 Freiburg
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Steffen Minter

University of Paderborn - Department of Economics ( email )

Warburger Str. 100
D-33098 Paderborn
Germany

Maximilian Stephan

University of Freiburg ( email )

Fahnenbergplatz
Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

Handirk Von Ungern‐Sternberg

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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