Ethical Voting in Multicandidate Elections

42 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2017 Last revised: 23 Oct 2017

See all articles by Laurent Bouton

Laurent Bouton

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Benjamin Ogden

Texas A&M University, Department of Political Science

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2017

Abstract

We study the behavior of ethical voters in multicandidate elections. We consider two common electoral rules: plurality and majority runoff. Our model delivers crisper predictions than those of the pivotal voter model. An equilibrium always exists, and is unique for a broad range of parameter values. There are two types of equilibria: (i) the sincere voting equilibrium (voters vote for their most-preferred candidate), and (ii) Duverger's Law equilibria (two candidates attract all the votes). These never coexist. We identify the features of an election that favor sincere voting. Consistent with evidence, incentives to vote sincerely are stronger under majority runoff.

Keywords: Ethical Voting, Group-based Voting, Majority Runoff Rule, Multicandidate Elections, Plurality Rule

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation

Bouton, Laurent and Ogden, Benjamin, Ethical Voting in Multicandidate Elections (October 2017). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12374, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3053902

Laurent Bouton (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Benjamin Ogden

Texas A&M University, Department of Political Science

College Station, TX 77843-4353
United States

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