Dictators’ Behavior Under Conditions of Economic Sanctions Cumulative Effect

36 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2017

See all articles by Kirill Chmel

Kirill Chmel

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Alexander Demin

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Kirill Kazantcev

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: October 23, 2017

Abstract

Economic sanctions, like the most of political events involving numerous states, are almost always explicitly aimed to alter internal policies and affect domestic issues. Sanctions are not a discrete event, rather they are a long lasting insidious process. It is significant to consider not only the state of the country under sanctions or without them, but also the effect of the time under sanctions. Hence, the research question is as follows: How does cumulative effect of sanctions influence the dictators behavior in terms of repressions and co-optation? In order to find a feasible answer to that question, first, we build a theoretical model and draw empirical implications from it. The main argument that we develop in the paper is as follows. The overall effect of sanction is robustly important for the dictator, fostering repressions and co-optation (separately treated) as the ways of buttressing the regime legitimacy. Moreover, cumulative effect of sanctions (i.e. the influence of all the previous periods under sanctions) increases the levels of repressions with decreasing marginal effects.

Keywords: authoritarian regimes, dictators strategies, sanctions, repressions, co-optation, game theory

JEL Classification: F51, P26

Suggested Citation

Chmel, Kirill and Demin, Alexander and Kazantcev, Kirill, Dictators’ Behavior Under Conditions of Economic Sanctions Cumulative Effect (October 23, 2017). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 50/PS/2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3057272 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3057272

Kirill Chmel (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Alexander Demin

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Kirill Kazantcev

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

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