Disappearing Discounts: Hedge Fund Activism in Conglomerates

103 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2017 Last revised: 2 Nov 2021

See all articles by Sehoon Kim

Sehoon Kim

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

Date Written: September 28, 2021

Abstract

Hedge fund activism reduces the diversification discount in targeted conglomerates. Associated with this reduction, targets increase investments in segments with better opportunities while alleviating divisional financial constraints. These improvements are stronger for financially constrained targets and associated with subsequent increases in CEO replacements by outsiders or candidates without social ties with divisional managers, higher divisional manager turnovers, more incentive-based compensation for divisional managers, increased payout, and less low-specificity innovation. While some targets divest poorly performing segments post-targeting, the efficiency improvements are not driven by refocusing. The results are consistent with activist hedge funds unlocking the value of internal capital markets in conglomerates.

Keywords: Conglomerates, Corporate Governance, Diversification, Hedge Fund Activism, Internal Capital Markets, Resource Allocation

JEL Classification: G23, G31, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Kim, Sehoon, Disappearing Discounts: Hedge Fund Activism in Conglomerates (September 28, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070676 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3070676

Sehoon Kim (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ( email )

P.O. Box 117168
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States

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