Persuasion via Weak Institutions

63 Pages Posted: 10 May 2018 Last revised: 27 Dec 2021

See all articles by Elliot Lipnowski

Elliot Lipnowski

Columbia University

Doron Ravid

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Denis Shishkin

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Date Written: December 23, 2021

Abstract

A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver, but influences the report with some probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to a discontinuous drop in the sender’s payoffs. To derive our results, we geometrically characterize the sender’s highest equilibrium payoff, which is based on the concavification of a capped value function.

Keywords: persuasion, weak institutions, cheap talk, belief-based approach, information design

JEL Classification: D82, D83, D73, D02

Suggested Citation

Lipnowski, Elliot and Ravid, Doron and Shishkin, Denis, Persuasion via Weak Institutions (December 23, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3168103 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168103

Elliot Lipnowski (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Doron Ravid

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 E. 59th St
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Denis Shishkin

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

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