Can Non-CEO Inside Directors Add Value? Evidence From Unplanned CEO Turnovers

Review of Accounting and Finance, Forthcoming

44 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2018 Last revised: 20 May 2019

Date Written: January 22, 2019

Abstract

This paper investigates the roles of non-CEO inside directors (NCIDs) in the new CEO-firm matching process using the context of unplanned CEO departures when immediate CEO succession planning becomes a sole board responsibility. Although critics argue that inside directors decrease the monitoring effectiveness of a board, inside directors arguably possess superior firm specific experience and knowledge that can be beneficial during the leadership transition. Using a comprehensive, manually collected data set of unplanned CEO departures from 1993 to 2012, we find evidence that firms with NCIDs incur lower costs and have stronger performance after an unplanned CEO departure. The impact of NCIDs is particularly important when the firm hires an outsider as the new CEO. These results suggest that board composition affects frictions in the CEO labor market.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, CEO Succession, CEO Turnover, Board of Directors

JEL Classification: G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Krigman, Laurie and Rivolta, Mia L., Can Non-CEO Inside Directors Add Value? Evidence From Unplanned CEO Turnovers (January 22, 2019). Review of Accounting and Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3190307 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3190307

Laurie Krigman (Contact Author)

Babson College ( email )

Finance Division
321 Tomasso Hall
Babson Park, MA 02457-0310
United States
781-239-4246 (Phone)

Mia L. Rivolta

Xavier University ( email )

3800 Victory Pkwy
Cincinnati, OH 45207
United States

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