Banks, Insider Connections, and Industrialization in New England: Evidence from the Panic of 1873

61 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2018 Last revised: 7 Oct 2021

See all articles by Eric Hilt

Eric Hilt

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Wellesley College

Date Written: July 2018

Abstract

This paper studies the role of bank affiliations in mitigating frictions related to asymmetric information. The analysis focuses on Massachusetts, and tests whether firms with bank directors on their boards fared better following the Panic of 1873, which did not directly impact the state’s commercial banks, but produced a prolonged economic slump. Around 59 percent of all non-financial corporations in the state had a bank director on their board in 1872. These firms survived the recession of the 1870s at higher rates, grew faster and experienced less of a deterioration in their credit ratings. Consistent with banker-directors helping to resolve problems related to asymmetric information, these effects were strongest among young firms. Counterfactual estimates suggest that in the absence of bank affiliations, the total assets of the non-financial corporations in Massachusetts that existed in 1872 would have been 35 percent lower in the wake of the recession. These results suggest an important role for the banking sector in New England’s industrialization, namely that affiliations with commercial banks helped nonfinancial corporations maintain access to external finance during economic downturns.

Suggested Citation

Hilt, Eric, Banks, Insider Connections, and Industrialization in New England: Evidence from the Panic of 1873 (July 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w24792, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3214295

Eric Hilt (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Wellesley College ( email )

106 Central St.
Wellesley, MA 02181
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.erichilt.net

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
5
Abstract Views
177
PlumX Metrics