Force Behind Anti-Corruption: Evidence from China

Posted: 20 Aug 2018 Last revised: 3 Jan 2022

See all articles by Hong Ru

Hong Ru

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University

Date Written: September 28, 2021

Abstract

This paper documents the clientelism in anti-corruption investigations across the politician patronage network in China. Having connections to highly ranked politicians in the Politburo makes local politicians 56.3% less likely to be investigated; they are also more likely to receive a lighter sentence after being investigated. I employ a regression discontinuity design to establish the causality of this protection effect. I use the mandatory retirement age of 68 years for Politburo members as the cut-off and find discontinuous jumps in the probability that local politicians will be investigated when their connected Politburo members step down at the retirement age cut-off.

Keywords: Anti-Corruption, Patronage connection, Protection

JEL Classification: D72, D73, G0, P26

Suggested Citation

Ru, Hong, Force Behind Anti-Corruption: Evidence from China (September 28, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227368 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3227368

Hong Ru (Contact Author)

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University ( email )

Singapore, 639798
Singapore
(+65) 67904661 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://hongru.mit.edu/

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