Incentives for Information Provision: Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Rental Market

27 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2018 Last revised: 24 Mar 2020

See all articles by Natalia Fabra

Natalia Fabra

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Departmento de Economia

Xueying Bian

Singapore Management University

Date Written: October 2018

Abstract

We build a search model with asymmetric information regarding houses´ energy efficiency. The objective is to shed light on the house owners` incentives to obtain and disclose energy certificates (ECs) in the rental market. Such incentives depend not only on the rent premium for more efficient houses - as has been widely documented - but also on the rent penalty for unlabeled houses. Interestingly, we show that such a penalty is higher the greater the disclosure rate of ECs. The theoretical predictions are empirically quantified in the context of the Spanish rental market.

Keywords: adoption rate, asymmetric information, energy efficiency, rental market

Suggested Citation

Fabra, Natalia and Bian, Xueying, Incentives for Information Provision: Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Rental Market (October 2018). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13270, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3270949

Natalia Fabra

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Departmento de Economia ( email )

E-28903 Getafe (Madrid)
Spain
+34-91 6249594 (Phone)
+34-91 6249329 (Fax)

Xueying Bian (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University ( email )

Li Ka Shing Library
70 Stamford Road
Singapore 178901, 178899
Singapore

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