Not Welcome Anymore: The Effect of Electoral Incentives on the Reception of Refugees

94 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2018

See all articles by Matteo Gamalerio

Matteo Gamalerio

University of Barcelona - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? I study this question in the setting of Italian municipalities making decisions about the reception of refugees. The localized control of the reception policy (SPRAR), combined with the exogenous timing of policy decisions and staggered elections, enables me to study the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees. Although municipalities receive fiscal grants for hosting refugees, electoral incentives reduce the probability of opening a refugee centre by 24 per cent. The effect is driven by voters' misperception of immigrants and by extreme-right political preferences. The results explain why is difficult to reach an equal redistribution of refugees across and within countries.

Keywords: migration, reception of refugees, electoral incentives, fiscal grants

JEL Classification: R230, J610, D720, C230

Suggested Citation

Gamalerio, Matteo, Not Welcome Anymore: The Effect of Electoral Incentives on the Reception of Refugees (2018). CESifo Working Paper No. 7212, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3275385 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3275385

Matteo Gamalerio (Contact Author)

University of Barcelona - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) ( email )

c/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
70
Abstract Views
486
rank
419,888
PlumX Metrics