Directors' Remuneration: A Comparison of Italian and Uk Non-Financial Listed Firms' Disclosure

Posted: 28 Nov 2018

See all articles by Andrea Melis

Andrea Melis

University of Cagliari

Silvia Gaia

University of Rome III

Silvia Carta

Universita di Cagliari

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

Directors’ remuneration is a key issue for both academics and policymakers. It has caused enormous controversy in recent years. This study uses a comprehensive index to analyse the disclosure of directors’ remuneration in Italian and UK listed firms. It finds that the level of voluntary disclosure is significantly associated with firm-specific incentives, such as the demand for information from investors and the need for legitimacy. It finds that the level of voluntary disclosure is significantly higher in the UK than in Italy and that firm-specific incentives to disclose voluntary information differ according to the institutional setting in which a firm operates. In the UK, firm-specific incentives mostly come from the demand for information, estimated with the level of ownership diffusion, and the need for legitimacy generated by poor market performance and shareholders’ dissent. In Italy, firm-specific incentives seem to be represented by the need for legitimacy generated by media coverage. This study also provides evidence that, in both countries, the information disclosed in corporate documents does not allow readers to obtain a comprehensive picture of directors’ remuneration. Bonuses are poorly disclosed even though they are a key element of directors’ remuneration. This finding is clearly important for policymakers at European and national level.

Keywords: director compensation, disclosure, legitimacy theory, agency theory

JEL Classification: M40, M12, G34

Suggested Citation

Melis, Andrea and Gaia, Silvia and Carta, Silvia, Directors' Remuneration: A Comparison of Italian and Uk Non-Financial Listed Firms' Disclosure (2015). British Accounting Review, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277850

Andrea Melis (Contact Author)

University of Cagliari ( email )

Dipartimento di Scienze economiche ed aziendali
Viale S. Ignazio 17
Cagliari, 09123
Italy
+39-070-6753302 (Phone)
+39-070-6753321 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.unica.it/andreamelis

Silvia Gaia

University of Rome III ( email )

Via Ostiense, 159
RM

Silvia Carta

Universita di Cagliari ( email )

Cagliari
Italy

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