Clawback Provisions and Firm Risk
Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2019-13
62 Pages Posted: 3 May 2019
Date Written: April 30, 2019
Panel OLS and GMM-IV estimates indicate that executives respond to the adoption of a compensation clawback provision by decreasing firm risk. The mechanisms that transmit incentives to decisions and decisions to risk appear to be more conservative investment and financial policies and preemptive management of ESG, legal, and cyberattack risks. The stock market reaction to the announcement of a clawback adoption, as well as post-adoption stock and accounting performance, are significantly and positively related to the actual and predicted reduction in firm risk. The reduction in firm risk, arising from adoption of a clawback policy, appears to benefit shareholders.
Keywords: Clawback, recoupment, recover, executive compensation, employee pay, accounting restatement, fraud, corporate governance
JEL Classification: G32, G34, J33, M41, M52, M55
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation