Matching with Incomplete Preferences

29 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2020 Last revised: 14 Sep 2020

Date Written: February 15, 2020

Abstract

We study a two-sided marriage market in whic agents have incomplete preferences—i.e., they find some alternatives incomparable. The strong (weak) core consists of matchings wherein no coalition wants to form a new match between themselves, leaving some (all) agents better off without harming anyone. The strong core may be empty, while the weak core can be too large. We propose the concept of "compromise core''—a nonempty set that sits between the weak and the strong cores. Similarly, we define the men-(women-) optimal core and illustrate its benefit in an application to India's engineering college admissions system.

Keywords: Matching, Market Design, Incomplete Preferences

Suggested Citation

Kuvalekar, Aditya, Matching with Incomplete Preferences (February 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3560889 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3560889

Aditya Kuvalekar (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

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