Lessons from Corporate Influence in the Opioid Epidemic: Toward a Norm of Separation

Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (2020)

DOI: 10.1007/s11673-020-09982-x

35 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2020

Date Written: April 27, 2020


There is overwhelming evidence that the opioid crisis which has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars (and counting) has been created or exacerbated by webs of influence woven by several pharmaceutical companies. These webs involve health professionals, patient advocacy groups, medical professional societies, research universities, teaching hospitals, public health agencies, policymakers, and legislators. Opioid companies built these webs as part of corporate strategies of influence that were designed to expand the opioid market from cancer patients to larger groups of patients with acute or chronic pain, to increase dosage as well as opioid use, to downplay the risks of addiction and abuse, and to characterize physicians’ concerns about the addiction and abuse risks as “opiophobia.” In the face of these pervasive strategies, conflict of interest policies have proven insufficient for addressing corporate influence in medical practice, medical research, and public health policy. Governments, the academy, and civil society need to develop counter-strategies to insulate themselves from corporate influence and to preserve their integrity and public trust. These strategies require a paradigm shift from partnerships with the private sector, which are ordinarily vehicles for corporate influence, to a norm of separation.

Keywords: Opioids; Corporate Influence; Public-Private Partnerships; Conflict of Interest; Institutional Integrity; Public Health Ethics

JEL Classification: L32, L33, L38, K29

Suggested Citation

Marks, Jonathan H., Lessons from Corporate Influence in the Opioid Epidemic: Toward a Norm of Separation (April 27, 2020). Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (2020), DOI: 10.1007/s11673-020-09982-x, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655082 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3655082

Jonathan H. Marks (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

135 Sparks Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States
814-865 5938 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jonathanhmarks.org

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