Law Enforcement and Criminality: Europe Vs. USA

1 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2003 Last revised: 18 Jun 2009

See all articles by Dominique Demougin

Dominique Demougin

EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und Recht - EBS Business School - Department of Governance & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Robert Schwager

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW); University of Magdeburg

Date Written: 2003

Abstract

We use a stylized model to show that, if transfers to the poor are founded on a security argument, there is a negative trade-off between law enforcement expenditures and criminality. In contrast, if transfers are based on altruism, the correlation between the same variables may appear positive. We argue that it provides a plausible eplanation for the startling difference between the US and Europe in crime statistics and law enforcement expenditures.

Keywords: Criminality, Law enforcement, Social system

Suggested Citation

Demougin, Dominique and Schwager, Robert, Law Enforcement and Criminality: Europe Vs. USA (2003). International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 217-225, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 99-44, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=376189 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.376189

Dominique Demougin (Contact Author)

EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und Recht - EBS Business School - Department of Governance & Economics ( email )

International University Schloss Reichartshausen
Campus Wiesbaden, Soehnleinstrasse 8A
Wiesbaden, 65201
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Muenchen, 81679
Germany

Robert Schwager

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
00 49 621 1235160 (Phone)
00 49 621 1235215 (Fax)

University of Magdeburg

Universitätspl. 2
PSF 4120
Magdeburg, D-39106
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
138
Abstract Views
1,894
rank
270,088
PlumX Metrics