Monopoly and Monopsony: Antitrust Standing, Injury, and Damages

31 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2021 Last revised: 11 Sep 2021

See all articles by Tirza Angerhofer

Tirza Angerhofer

University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration - Department of Economics; Duke University - Department of Economics

Roger D. Blair

University of Florida

Date Written: March 5, 2021

Abstract

This article examines the economic consequences of collusion in both the output market and one of the input markets. It examines the results of sequential collusion, which leads to complications and inconsistencies in measuring antitrust damages. It also examines simultaneous collusion in both the input and output markets. Ultimately, the profit maximizing equilibrium is identical but there are complications along the way to the final collusive equilibrium. The article explores the private plaintiff problems involving antitrust standing, proving antitrust injury, and estimating antitrust damages.

Suggested Citation

Angerhofer, Tirza and Blair, Roger D., Monopoly and Monopsony: Antitrust Standing, Injury, and Damages (March 5, 2021). 89 U. Cin. L. Rev. 256 (2021), University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 21-21, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3798799

Tirza Angerhofer

University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration - Department of Economics ( email )

Gainesville, FL 32611-7140
United States

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Roger D. Blair (Contact Author)

University of Florida ( email )

342 Matherly Hall
Gainesville, FL 32611-7140
United States
352-392-0179 (Phone)
352-392-7860 (Fax)

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