An Auction Mechanism for Platoon Leader Determination in Single-Brand Cooperative Vehicle Platooning

Posted: 19 Mar 2021

See all articles by Xiaotong Sun

Xiaotong Sun

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Intelligent Transportation Thrust, System Hub

Yafeng Yin

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Date Written: October 15, 2020

Abstract

Cooperative vehicle platooning enabled by connected automated vehicle (CAV) technology has been identified to bring energy savings and driving-effort reduction. However, the intrinsic difference of gained benefits between the leading vehicle and the following vehicles hampers the spontaneous platooning via peer-to-peer coordination. This study proposes an auction mechanism that determines the leader-follower positioning together with the associated benefits, for facilitating the formation and maintaining the behavioral stability of vehicle platoons in a distributed way. We theoretically prove that there is no mechanism to achieve an efficient outcome in an ex post equilibrium, requiring individual rationality and budget balance. In this regard, we provide a truthful $\epsilon-$approximate auction mechanism that deploys a linear transfer function, which guarantees that the implemented outcome is an efficient approximate dominant strategy equilibrium.

Keywords: vehicle platooning, energy savings, driving-effort reduction, auction, truthful $\epsilon-$approximate mechanism

Suggested Citation

Sun, Xiaotong and Sun, Xiaotong and Yin, Yafeng, An Auction Mechanism for Platoon Leader Determination in Single-Brand Cooperative Vehicle Platooning (October 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3805126 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3805126

Xiaotong Sun (Contact Author)

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor ( email )

500 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

Intelligent Transportation Thrust, System Hub ( email )

China

Yafeng Yin

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor ( email )

2350
Hayward Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

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