Doing It by the Book: Political Contestability and Public Contract Renegotiations

VoxEU.org 2021

5 Pages Posted: 24 May 2021

See all articles by Jean Beuve

Jean Beuve

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne (CES)

Marian W. Moszoro

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH); International Monetary Fund (IMF); George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES)

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Date Written: March 23, 2021

Abstract

The frequent renegotiation of public contracts is variously attributed to collusion between officials and bidders, the desire to circumvent budgetary rules, and other factors. This column challenges the industrial organisation view of public contract renegotiation, showing that frequent renegotiations can be understood as a consequence of the non-remediable, rigid nature of contracts rather than an inherent consequence of opportunistic behaviour.

Keywords: Procurement, Political Contestability, Contractual Rigidity, Renegotiations

JEL Classification: D23, D72, D73, D78, H57

Suggested Citation

Beuve, Jean and Moszoro, Marian W. and Spiller, Pablo T., Doing It by the Book: Political Contestability and Public Contract Renegotiations (March 23, 2021). VoxEU.org 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3849236

Jean Beuve

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne (CES) ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'hopital
106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France

Marian W. Moszoro (Contact Author)

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) ( email )

aleja Niepodleglosci 162
PL-Warsaw, 02-554
Poland

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://economics.gmu.edu/people/mmoszoro

George Mason University - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES) ( email )

400P Truland Building
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )

545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1502 (Phone)
510-642-2826 (Fax)

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