Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite

69 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2021 Last revised: 18 Nov 2021

See all articles by Alma Cohen

Alma Cohen

Harvard Law School; Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Moshe Hazan

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

David Weiss

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2021

Abstract

Are the political preferences of CEOs associated with the representation and compensation of women in the executive suite? We find that Democratic CEOs (those who contribute more to Democratic candidates) are associated with higher representation of women in the executive suite. To explore causality, we use an event study approach and show that replacing a Republican with a Democratic CEO is associated with 20%-60% in more women in the executive suite. Finally, we show that Democratic CEOs associated with a significant reduction (or even disappearance) of the gender gap in the level and performance-sensitivity of executive pay.

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Suggested Citation

Cohen, Alma and Hazan, Moshe and Weiss, David, Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite (June 2021). NBER Working Paper No. w28893, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3861423 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3861423

Alma Cohen (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 496-4099 (Phone)
(617) 812-0554 (Fax)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Moshe Hazan

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 6997801
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://www.moshehazan.sites.tau.ac.il/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

David Weiss

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

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