Does the Frequency of Reminders Matter for Their Effectiveness? A Randomized Controlled Trial

28 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2021

See all articles by Armenak Antinyan

Armenak Antinyan

Wenlan School of Business; Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School

Zareh Asatryan

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Zhixin Dai

School of Finance, Renmin University of China; GATE CNRS UMR 5824; University of Lyon

Kezhi Wang

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: July 26, 2021

Abstract

We assess the impact of reminder frequency on the probability of paying overdue property taxes in a randomized controlled trial in China. One reminder a week (sent as a text message) considerably increases the probability of tax compliance and results in tangible fiscal gains compared to a one-off reminder. However, increasing the frequency of reminders to two text messages a week diminishes their effectiveness. The takeaway of our study is that frequent reminders are an important trigger for human behavior, nonetheless, beyond a certain frequency the effectiveness of additional reminders seems to decline.

Keywords: Reminder Frequency, Randomized Controlled Trial, Tax Compliance

JEL Classification: C93, H24, H26

Suggested Citation

Antinyan, Armenak and Asatryan, Zareh and Dai, Zhixin and Wang, Kezhi, Does the Frequency of Reminders Matter for Their Effectiveness? A Randomized Controlled Trial (July 26, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3893281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3893281

Armenak Antinyan (Contact Author)

Wenlan School of Business ( email )

No.143, Wuluo Road
Wuhan, Hubei 430073
China

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School ( email )

Aberconway Building
Colum Drive
Cardiff, CF10 3EU
United Kingdom

Zareh Asatryan

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Zhixin Dai

School of Finance, Renmin University of China ( email )

59 Zhongguancun Street
Beijing, 100872
China

GATE CNRS UMR 5824 ( email )

93 Chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69009
France

University of Lyon ( email )

Faculté de Sciences Economiques et de Gestion
16, quai Claude Bernard
Lyon, 69007
France

Kezhi Wang

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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