More Competitive Search Through Regulation

46 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2021

See all articles by Paul Heidhues

Paul Heidhues

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf

Alessandro Bonatti

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

L. Elisa Celis

Yale University

Gregory S. Crawford

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

David Dinielli

Yale - Tobin Center for Economic Policy

Michael Luca

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Tobias Salz

MIT

Monika Schnitzer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU)

Fiona M. Scott Morton

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Katja Seim

Yale School of Management

Michael Sinkinson

Yale SOM

Jidong Zhou

Yale School of Management

Date Written: September 14, 2021

Abstract

This paper identifies a set of possible regulations that could be used both to make the search market more competitive and simultaneously ameliorate the harms flowing from Google’s current monopoly position. The purpose of this paper is to identify conceptual problems and solutions based on sound economic principles and to begin a discussion from which robust and specific policy recommendations can be drafted. Consumers are harmed when a single, for-profit firm acts as the solitary gatekeeper between billions of end users and those with whom they would transact. These harms become even larger when innovative new technologies such as the internet of things may be captured by the incumbent monopolist. Economic theory can help us develop and apply regulations that lower entry barriers and encourage competition in this important market.

Suggested Citation

Heidhues, Paul and Bonatti, Alessandro and Celis, L. Elisa and Crawford, Gregory S. and Dinielli, David and Luca, Michael and Salz, Tobias and Schnitzer, Monika and Scott Morton, Fiona M. and Seim, Katja and Sinkinson, Michael and Zhou, Jidong, More Competitive Search Through Regulation (September 14, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3923593 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3923593

Paul Heidhues (Contact Author)

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf

Universitätsstrasse 1
Duesseldorf, DE NRW 40225
Germany

Alessandro Bonatti

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

L. Elisa Celis

Yale University ( email )

493 College St
New Haven, CT CT 06520
United States
203.432.0666 (Phone)

Gregory S. Crawford

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Schönberggasse 1
Zürich, CH-8001
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/faculty/groupcrawford.html

David Dinielli

Yale - Tobin Center for Economic Policy ( email )

New Haven, CT 06520
United States

Michael Luca

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=602417

Tobias Salz

MIT ( email )

50 Memorial Dr
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://economics.mit.edu/faculty/tsalz

Monika Schnitzer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, DE Bavaria 80539
Germany

Fiona M. Scott Morton

Yale School of Management ( email )

New Haven, CT 06520
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Katja Seim

Yale School of Management ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

Michael Sinkinson

Yale SOM ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

Jidong Zhou

Yale School of Management ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

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