Circles of Trust: Rival Information in Social Networks

27 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2021

See all articles by Samuel Lee

Samuel Lee

Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swedish House of Finance

Petra Persson

Stanford University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Nikita Roketskiy

University College London - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2021

Abstract

We analyze the diffusion of rival information in a social network. In our model, rational agents can share information sequentially, unconstrained by an exogenous protocol or timing. We show how to compute the set of eventually informed agents for any network, and show that it is essentially unique under altruistic preferences. The relationship between network structure and information diffusion is complex because the former shapes both the charity and confidentiality of potential senders and receivers.

Keywords: Rival Information, Social Networks, strategic information transmission

Suggested Citation

Lee, Samuel and Persson, Petra and Roketskiy, Nikita, Circles of Trust: Rival Information in Social Networks (October 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3960177

Samuel Lee (Contact Author)

Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA California 95053
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Petra Persson

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Nikita Roketskiy

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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