Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules

30 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2003

See all articles by Simon J. Evenett

Simon J. Evenett

University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2003

Abstract

The effects on national welfare and on market access of two public procurement practices, discrimination and non-transparency, are examined. Both policies have become prominent in international trade negotiations, such as the ongoing Doha Round of WTO trade talks. Our analysis shows that fostering either domestic competition or transparency in state contracting tends to improve welfare. In contrast, we find no clear-cut effect on market access of ending discrimination or improving transparency. This mismatch between market access and welfare effects may account for the slower progress in negotiating procurement disciplines in trade agreements than for traditional border measures such as tariffs.

JEL Classification: F13, H57

Suggested Citation

Evenett, Simon J. and Hoekman, Bernard and Hoekman, Bernard, Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules (November 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=480302

Simon J. Evenett (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

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Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
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44 1865 288 805 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United Kingdom

Bernard Hoekman

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

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50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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