Midnight Dumping: Public Policies and Illegal Disposal of Used Oil

Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring 1998)

Posted: 19 Dec 1997

See all articles by Hilary Sigman

Hilary Sigman

Rutgers University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

Many public policies for hazardous waste raise the costs of legal disposal. Concerned about substitution of illegal disposal, economists have instead recommended policies that reward desirable waste management alternatives. This article studies the empirical determinants of dumping as reported to the U.S. Emergency Response Notification Systems (ERNS). It analyzes the frequency of used oil dumping using count-data models. The results suggest that dumping is sensitive to the cost of legal waste management options, including disposal and reuse, and to the threat of enforcement. In particular, state policies that restrict legal disposal cause substantial substitution of illegal dumping.

JEL Classification: Q39

Suggested Citation

Sigman, Hilary A., Midnight Dumping: Public Policies and Illegal Disposal of Used Oil. Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring 1998), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=48295

Hilary A. Sigman (Contact Author)

Rutgers University - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States

HOME PAGE: http://econweb.rutgers.edu/sigman

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