The Power of Monitoring

19 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2004

See all articles by Udo C. Braendle

Udo C. Braendle

American University in Dubai

Juergen Noll

University of Vienna - Department for Business Studies

Date Written: April 13, 2004

Abstract

The corporation celebrates its 400th birthday. What Adam Smith treated sceptically in his home country, has become the dominant organizational form all over the world. Closely related with the history of the corporation is the separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (management). As the managers do not necessarily behave as shareholders want them to, internal and external monitoring mechanisms developed over time, but different within the two legal systems of Common and Civil Law. In this contribution theoretical and empirical literature concerning internal and external monitoring devices is substantially reviewed. We find that in Common Law and Civil law countries as well monitoring systems are established to align the managers' interests with those of the external capital providers. But neither system is perfect. Although monitoring turns out to be a necessity providing a second-best solution to the inherent principal-agent situation between owner and managers of a firm there are inevitable weaknesses which one should be aware of.

Keywords: principal-agent-problem, internal and external monitoring, Common Law, Civil Law

JEL Classification: M52, J33, K00, K20

Suggested Citation

Braendle, Udo C. and Noll, Juergen, The Power of Monitoring (April 13, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=530482 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.530482

Udo C. Braendle

American University in Dubai ( email )

Dubai, UAE 28282
United Arab Emirates

Juergen Noll (Contact Author)

University of Vienna - Department for Business Studies ( email )

Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna, A1210
Austria
+43 1 42 77 38 105 (Phone)
+43 1 42 77 38 104 (Fax)

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