The Sale of Small Firms: A Multidimensional Analysis

Posted: 21 Jun 2004

See all articles by Christian At

Christian At

Université de Franche-Comté - CRESE

Pierre-Henri Morand

University Franche-Comte

Abstract

This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.

Keywords: Security voting structure, auctions, small firms

JEL Classification: D44, G34

Suggested Citation

At, Christian and Morand, Pierre-Henri, The Sale of Small Firms: A Multidimensional Analysis. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=557111

Christian At (Contact Author)

Université de Franche-Comté - CRESE ( email )

1 rue Claude Goudimel
25030 Besancon cedex, DOUBS 25000
France

Pierre-Henri Morand

University Franche-Comte ( email )

1 rue Claude Goudimel
25030 Besancon cedex, DOUBS 25000
France

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