Crime Timing

10 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2004

See all articles by Christian At

Christian At

Université de Franche-Comté - CRESE

Nathalie Chappe

University of Burgundy Franche-Comté

Abstract

Under a dynamic framework, we find that a profitable crime now may be not optimal and hence, not committed; a not profitable crime now may become optimal in the future. Moreover, if individuals can choose when to commit a crime, underdeterrence will be the optimal law enforcement policy.

Keywords: Economics of crime, law enforcement

JEL Classification: K4

Suggested Citation

At, Christian and Chappe, Nathalie, Crime Timing. Economics Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 2 pp. 1−7, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=558243 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.558243

Christian At (Contact Author)

Université de Franche-Comté - CRESE ( email )

1 rue Claude Goudimel
25030 Besancon cedex, DOUBS 25000
France

Nathalie Chappe

University of Burgundy Franche-Comté ( email )

45 D avenue de l'observatoire
CRESE
25030 Besancon cedex, DOUBS 25000
France

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