Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions

Posted: 24 Jun 2004

See all articles by Guy L. F. Holburn

Guy L. F. Holburn

University of Western Ontario - Richard Ivey School of Business

Richard Vanden Bergh

University of Vermont - School of Business Administration

Abstract

We draw on the positive political theory and campaign finance literatures to examine how interest groups allocate influence activities (e.g., monetary donations, lobbying) across multiple government institutions when seeking more favorable agency policy decisions. By modeling agency behavior in the context of legislative oversight, we derive testable predictions about the political conditions under which an interest group will influence (1) only the agency, (2) the legislature and/or executive instead of the agency, and (3) the legislature or executive in addition to the agency in order to induce a shift in regulatory policy. One implication of our conclusions relating to (2) and (3) is that empirical studies seeking to identify a relationship between electoral campaign contributions and public policy using data on legislative votes are potentially misspecified.

Suggested Citation

Holburn, Guy L. F. and Vanden Bergh, Richard, Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 458-483, 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=558362

Guy L. F. Holburn (Contact Author)

University of Western Ontario - Richard Ivey School of Business ( email )

1151 Richmond Street North
London, Ontario N6A 3K7
Canada

Richard Vanden Bergh

University of Vermont - School of Business Administration ( email )

Burlington, VT 05405
United States
8026568720 (Phone)

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