Leverage and the Complexity of Takeovers

Abstract

There is scant empirical evidence on how the leverage of target firms affects gains to their shareholders, although there are several widely-cited economic theories offered in the literature. The limited available evidence shows that shareholders of targets with greater leverage experience higher returns. However, even this observed effect of debt on takeovers can not be distinguished from a mere mechanical pure leveraging effect, leaving the economic explanations untested. Consequently, we adopt an alternative approach here to examine if targets' debt truly matters in takeovers. We report that acquisition processes involving targets with higher leverage tend to be significantly more complex in several ways. We find that such acquisitions tend to take a longer time to consume, are more likely to be associated with multiple bidder auctions, and experience greater revisions in offer prices. Finally, we find that factors that make takeovers more complex also lead to greater target gains.

Keywords: Target's leverage, target returns, takeover complexity

JEL Classification: G32, G34