On the Dynamics of Standards

UCSD Economics Discussion Paper 97-15

44 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 1998

See all articles by Joel Sobel

Joel Sobel

University of California at San Diego

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 1998


This paper models the process of promotion or entry into a club. The paper studies a two-parameter family of promotion models. Promotion requires that at least n of the N judges think that the candidate is at least as good as r of the R members in the current group of promoted agents. Candidates minimize the cost of acquiring a D dimensional characteristic, subject to being able to satisfy the promotion criteria. I assume that they must specialize in one characteristic. Under weak assumptions governing which agents leave and the preferences of candidates who arrive, standards decline over time if n/(N+1)<1/D; and standards increase if n/(N+1)>(D-1)/D. If the population of promoted agents must contain one agent specializing in each dimension, then standards decline if n/N<(r-1)/R; standards rise if (n-1)/N>r/R.

JEL Classification: D81, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Sobel, Joel, On the Dynamics of Standards (September 1998). UCSD Economics Discussion Paper 97-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=62548 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.62548

Joel Sobel (Contact Author)

University of California at San Diego ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
United States
619-534-4367 (Phone)
619-534-7040 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics