The EU Budget - How Much Scope for Institutional Reform?

33 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2005

See all articles by Henrik Enderlein

Henrik Enderlein

Hertie School

Johannes Lindner

European Central Bank (ECB)

Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez

European Central Bank (ECB)

Raymond Ritter

European Central Bank

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

This paper reviews current discussions on reforming the European Union (EU) budgetary procedure and assesses the main reform proposals that have been suggested thus far. It argues that prospects for reforms are presently hampered by the complex interplay between supranational and intergovernmental decision modes and the requirement of any budgetary procedure to strike a balance between efficiency and legitimacy. The paper reviews the main criticisms of the present budgetary procedure and the related reform proposals, which are assessed on the basis of relevant theoretical literature as well as brief comparisons with the federal budget of the United States. The paper argues that the current EU budgetary procedure maximizes efficiency and legitimacy, given the present state of political integration in the EU. Significant modifications to the budgetary procedure would depart from that equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

Enderlein, Henrik and Lindner, Johannes and Calvo-Gonzalez, Oscar and Ritter, Raymond, The EU Budget - How Much Scope for Institutional Reform? (April 2005). ECB Occasional Paper No. 27, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=752087 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.752087

Henrik Enderlein (Contact Author)

Hertie School ( email )

Berlin, 30123
Germany

Johannes Lindner

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Raymond Ritter

European Central Bank ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

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