Squatters, Production, and Violence

42 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2006

See all articles by Karen Clay

Karen Clay

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: February 2006


This paper uses a model and historical data from California in 1860, a time at which property rights were uncertain, to investigate the links among property rights, production, and violence. Consistent with the model, squatters had production that was 15-47 percent lower than non squatters; a 10 percent increase in the density of squatters was associated with an 8-17 percent decrease in agricultural output per acre, and, at levels above the mean, increased density of squatters was associated with higher levels of violence. The market for squatting does not appear to have been in equilibrium. This may reflect the imperfect information available to squatters, sorting based on a taste for violence, or our use of aggregate data. We then compare our results on agricultural production for California to results for other states west of the Mississippi in 1860 and in 1880. The negative effects of squatting were widespread in 1860, but by 1880 the effects had abated in many places as the number of squatters fell. The results on production and violence have implications for understanding the historical development of agriculture in the United States more broadly, since squatting on agricultural land was prevalent throughout the United States, and for understanding agriculture in the Third World, since uncertain property rights in agricultural land are still an issue today.

Keywords: property rights, agricultural production, California

JEL Classification: K11, N31, N51, Q13

Suggested Citation

Clay, Karen B., Squatters, Production, and Violence (February 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=886553 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886553

Karen B. Clay (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics