Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Corporate Efficiency: The Case of Ukraine
Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 26, No. 7, pp. 451-460, 2005
Posted: 6 Mar 2006
The goal of this paper is to examine the effects of different ownership structures and of the quality of corporate governance on the Farrell measure of efficiency. Data Envelopment Analysis and Limited Dependent Variable Estimations are applied to the set of Ukrainian joint-stock companies listed on the main Ukrainian stock exchange, First Securities Trading System. Domestic ownership of the organization is found to enhance efficiency the most, whereas managerial ownership has a detrimental effect on efficiency. Foreign owned firms are relatively inefficient; however foreign ownership is found to have a positive and significant effect on corporate governance quality. Concentrated ownership rights (including state ownership) improve efficiency, possibly reflecting country-specific factors. The quality of corporate governance is found to have a positive impact on the efficiency of domestically owned firms.
Keywords: Corporate governance, ownership structure, efficiency, DEA, Ukraine
JEL Classification: G32, G34, C24, D24, G30, P27
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