Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model

Posted: 11 Nov 2006

See all articles by Takanori Adachi

Takanori Adachi

Kyoto University - Graduate School of Management; Kyoto University - Graduate School of Economics

Yasutora Watanabe

University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

This paper proposes a method to estimate relative ministerial weights in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, we present a bargaining model of government formation and estimate structural parameters of the model using data for (i) who the formateurs are, (ii) what each party's voting weight is, and (iii) what ministerial seats each party obtains. We also measure the effects of voting weights and formateur advantage on bargaining results. We apply our proposed method to the case of Japan. Our estimation results show that political players value pork-related posts (such as the Minister of Construction) much more than prestigious ones (such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs). We also find that there is a significant formateur advantage, while voting weights do not have a significant scale effect, which is consistent with the findings for European democracies.

Keywords: Ministerial weights, bargaining game of government formation, structural estimation

JEL Classification: C78, D72

Suggested Citation

Adachi, Takanori and Watanabe, Yasutora, Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 24, No. 1, Spring 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=943490

Takanori Adachi

Kyoto University - Graduate School of Management ( email )

36-1 Yoshida-honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto, 606-8501
Japan

Kyoto University - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

36-1 Yoshida-honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto, 606-8501
Japan

Yasutora Watanabe (Contact Author)

University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

Tokyo
Japan

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
798
PlumX Metrics