Merge and Compete: Strategic Incentives for Vertical Integration

45 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2007

Date Written: December 2006

Abstract

Vertical integration followed by quantity competition is studied. In the first stage of the game downstream firms simultaneously decide whether to integrate with one of the upstream suppliers. If firms are not able to observe whether their vertically integrated competitor enters the intermediate-good market then they are indifferent about vertical integration. If the entry choice of the integrated firm is observable then the unique equilibrium involves vertical integration and in-house production of the intermediate good. The importance of entry observability sheds light on the strategic importance of information exchange institutions such as the internet and business fairs.

Keywords: Vertical integration, Cournot competition, Market entry

JEL Classification: L13, L22

Suggested Citation

Vergara Caffarelli, Filippo, Merge and Compete: Strategic Incentives for Vertical Integration (December 2006). Bank of Italy Economic Research Paper No. 608, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=954913 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.954913

Filippo Vergara Caffarelli (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

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