Incentives for Auditor Collusion in Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Regulatory Environment

Posted: 30 Mar 2007

Date Written: March 20, 2007

Abstract

This paper develops a single-play game theory model that looks at the strategic interactions between auditors and managers. This paper adds to the literature by explicitly modeling the possibility of collusion in a context where the outcome is unverifiable and the manager has the possibility of funding side-payments in such a way that they have little effect on his personal payoff.

Keywords: Auditing, Collusion, Game theory

JEL Classification: C72, D82, G18, G38, K22, M49, M41

Suggested Citation

Brown, Abigail B., Incentives for Auditor Collusion in Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Regulatory Environment (March 20, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=976169 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.976169

Abigail B. Brown (Contact Author)

Government Accountability Office ( email )

441 G St., NW
Washington, DC 20548
United States

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