The Causes of Civil War

33 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Marta Reynal-Querol

Marta Reynal-Querol

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences; World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Simeon Djankov

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics

Date Written: June 1, 2007

Abstract

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points' reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.

Keywords: Population Policies, Peace & Peacekeeping, Children and Youth, Services & Transfers to Poor, Inequality

Suggested Citation

Reynal-Querol, Marta and Reynal-Querol, Marta and Djankov, Simeon, The Causes of Civil War (June 1, 2007). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4254, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=995075

Marta Reynal-Querol (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
93 5422590 (Phone)

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-7891 (Phone)

Simeon Djankov

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
337
Abstract Views
1,977
rank
116,948
PlumX Metrics